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Is There an Independent Principle
of Causality in Physics?
John D. Norton
ABSTRACT
Mathias Frisch has argued that the requirement that electromagnetic dispersion pro-
cesses are causal adds empirical content not found in electrodynamic theory. I urge that
this attempt to reconstitute a local principle of causality in physics fails. An independent
principle is not needed to recover the results of dispersion theory. The use of ‘causality
conditions’ proves to be the mere adding of causal labels to an already presumed fact.
If instead one seeks a broader, independently formulated grounding for the conditions,
thatgroundingeitherfailsordissolvesintovaguenessandambiguity,ashastraditionally
been the fate of candidate principles of causality.
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1 Introduction
In his ([2009a]), Mathias Frisch responds to a skeptical tradition to which
I have contributed (Norton [2003], [2007]). That tradition doubts that the
sciences are founded upon an independent principle of causality. His response
leads him to argue that the requirement that certain physical processes are
causal does add further physical content. His example is dispersion in classical
electrodynamics. There causal considerations are invoked at a decisive moment
in the derivation of the dispersion relations, purportedly to provide physical
content not recoverable through the usual manipulations of electrodynamic
theory.
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Inthissense,Frischisproposingaprincipleofcausality.Hisprincipleasserts
that effects cannot precede their causes. It is independent in the sense that it
provides factual content not supplied by the relevant physical laws. Since he
is sure only that it applies to a few physical processes, Frisch allows that the
principle may not hold universally. So it is the proposal for an independent
principle of causality of restricted scope.
While Frisch’s example is both important and intriguing, my purpose in
this note is to argue that Frisch is mistaken in his analysis of it. After a brief
review of dispersion theory in Section 2, I will urge in Section 3 that the
causalconstraintsatissuearemerelyshorthandforphysicalconstraintsalready
recoverableinclassicalelectrodynamics,thoughpossiblynoteasilyrecoverable.
While I believe that we need to summon no causal metaphysics to complete
dispersion theory, in Section 4 I will explore the consequences of persisting in
efforts to do just this. Those efforts lead us in two directions. In one, we merely
end up assigning an additional adjective ‘causal’ to a condition we believe on
other grounds. In the other, we seek a precise, independent expression, usable
in physical theorizing, for the general requirement that effects cannot precede
their causes in processes like dispersion. Efforts to formulate this principle
independently lead to failure or vagueness and ambiguity.
This note was drafted as a response to parts of an earlier paper by Frisch
([unpublished], Section 4). Frisch’s present paper ([2009a]) is a rendering of the
relevant material from that earlier paper and he has now written a rejoinder
to this note (Frisch [2009b]). I do not believe that Frisch’s rejoinder succeeds.
However, I will refrain from responding point by point to his responses, lest
that trigger a combinatorial explosion. The text in the remaining sections is
unchanged other than in its references and in the elimination of a footnote that
has become superﬂuous.1 Readers of both Frisch and my notes are invited to
make the ﬁnal decision.
With regard to that decision, one point does bear discussion. My analysis
follows the standard presumption that phenomenological results in classical
electrodynamics are supervenient on a microdynamics governed by time re-
versible electrodynamics. These time reversible foundations cannot support a
timeirreversibleprincipleofcausality.Timeasymmetrycanonlybeintroduced
by stipulation through time asymmetric boundary conditions. Frisch has made
clear in his rejoinder the importance to him of his doubts about this standard
view. He believes ([2009a], Section 3) that ‘there are reasons to doubt that
dispersion theory with its causality condition can be rigorously derived from
an underlying micro-theory’.
1 An earlier version of that text was posted on philsci-archive as <philsci-archive.pitt.edu
/archive/00003832/> and the present revision was later posted to my website, <www.pitt
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This issue is too great in scope to be settled here. Fortunately, my principal
point stands, however it may be decided. Physicists developing dispersion the-
oryarriveatageneralresultthroughacomplicatedmixofintuitionsabouthow
electrodynamical systems behave, the experimental evidence, and more precise
computations on artiﬁcial examples. They have sought to legitimize that result
by appeals to ‘causality’, apparently believing that this calls up a greater body
of theory capable of grounding their inference. Yet there is no such greater
body of theory of sufﬁcient precision to be adequate to the task. Their use of
causal terminology is an exercise in labeling that merely brings an illusion of
more principled foundations.
2 Scattering in Classical Electrodynamics
Inclassicalelectrodynamics,adielectricscattersanincomingﬁeld.Intherough-
est outline, the basic supposition is that the scattered ﬁeld at a point x in space
in the dielectric at time t, written here as ‘scattered(x, t)’, depends linearly
on the incident ﬁeld ‘incident(x, t )’ at the same point x and other times t .
Hencescattered(x,t)canbereconstructedifweknowjustwhichscatteredﬁelds
G(x,t)arisefromadeltafunctionincidentﬁeld,atthesamepointxbutmassed
at time 0. 2 Linearity allows us to recover the scattered ﬁeld from an arbitrary
incoming ﬁeld by the integration
scattered(x,t) =
 ∞
−∞
G(x,t )incident(x,t − t )dt . (1)
In this integral, the scattered ﬁeld at x at time t is computed as a weighted
sum of the incident ﬁeld values at that same point x but at different times.
Informally, we are just summing the effects of the many pulses that comprise
the incident wave.
The quantity G(x, t ) determines the times for which the incident ﬁeld at x
contributes. The causality condition at issue requires that no incident ﬁeld at
a time later than t can contribute to the scattered ﬁeld at t. It is enforced by
requiring that3
G(x,t ) = 0, for all t  < 0( 2 )
for, with this condition, incident(x, t – t ) can make no contribution to the
integral of (1) whenever t – t  > t, that is, whenever t  < 0. Condition (2) tells us
that the scattered wave from an incident pulse is never earlier than the pulse.
2 That amounts to saying that G is a Green’s function. Its characteristics may be easier to see
if we rewrite (1) in terms of the variable τ = t – t . For then (1) becomes scattered(x,t) =  ∞
−∞ G(x,t − τ)incident(x,τ)dτ.
3 Or that the integral of (1) be computed only between the limits of t  = 0a n dt  =∞ .478 John D. Norton
3 Sufﬁciency of the Physics
The question at issue is the physical foundation of this condition (2). Frisch
believes that it is founded upon a principle of causality that is independent of
electrodynamic theory in the sense that it places additional factual constraints
on the theory. I maintain that the condition can and should be founded upon
existing electrodynamic theory alone.
To see why I hold this latter view, recall the physical process at issue. A
dielectric in classical theory consists of electric charges bound by restraining
forces in some sort of lattice, such as a crystal. Left to themselves, the charges
donotmove.Inascatteringprocess,anincidentelectromagneticwaveimpinges
on them and accelerates them. That sets off an oscillatory motion that in turn
leads the oscillating charges to emit electromagnetic radiation. The emitted
radiation is the scattered ﬁeld. The physical picture is analogous to a buoy
sitting in calm water. When water waves impinge on it, the buoy wobbles and
thereby sends out its own secondary ripples.
Classical electrodynamics is a time reversible theory. If it allows some pro-
cess, the theory also allows its time reverse. That means that the time reverse
of scattering is also allowed. In that case, we have a process in which electro-
magneticwavescollapsedownontoelectricchargesthatarealreadyoscillating.
They move in a way that is perfectly coordinated to collect the radiation com-
ing in from all directions and re-emit it in just one direction, and then come to
rest. It is possible to have even more complicated behaviors that combine the
essential elements of the two types of behavior sketched.
Insettingupthestandardanalysisofscatteringtheory,wechoosetoconsider
a small subset of all these possible processes. That is, we choose to consider the
special case that starts with the charges of the dielectric at rest with a (typically)
unidirectional, incident wave approaching. Our choice is expressed in initial
or boundary conditions that merely describe mathematically the situation just
sketched in words. We expect that, in these particular cases, the charges of the
dielectric will remain at rest until the incoming wave arrives. Only then will
they accelerate and emit the scattered ﬁeld. Condition (2) merely translates
that expectation into the particular case of a charge initially at rest interacting
with a pulse incident wave; the charge does not accelerate and emit a secondary
wave until the pulse has arrived.
Thetimeasymmetryoftheresultingprocessesarisespurelyfromourdecision
to consider a subset of all possible processes that happen to have a strong
asymmetry in time. No additional causal metaphysics is needed to impose the
time asymmetry. We stipulate it.
Condition (2) on the quantity G(x, t ) expresses formally the physical idea
that the scattered ﬁeld always comes after the incident ﬁeld that excites it. In
principle,that(2)obtainsisdeducibleinafullanalysisofhowthechargesofthe
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formula for G(x, t ). In practice, the sorts of forces that hold the charges in the
dielectric can have many forms and giving the completely general computation
is prohibitively complicated. As we shall see, the computation can be done
in some simple cases to get a full expression for G(x, t ) that does conform
with (2). There is little doubt that the most general computation, if it could be
done, would still return (2), for it is really only saying that, in the cases we are
considering, the dielectric charges respond to incident radiation; they do not
anticipate it.
Inthecontextoftheprecisecomputationsofscatteringtheory,thislastclaim
is an awkward one to make. Other formulas are computed precisely; this one is
just opined. It is quite understandable that physics authors might succumb to
the temptation of proclaiming the real foundation of (2) to lie in ‘causality’, for
that gives it an apparently more principled foundation. Perhaps they imagine
that somewhere, somehow, some philosopher has spelled out all the details
needed to make the inference precise. Yet, as I will argue in Section 4 below,
any such conﬁdence is misplaced. The apparent security of this foundation
can persist only as long as one does not try to spell out precisely what that
foundation is.
The extent to which writers of physics texts do succumb to this temptation
is not entirely clear to me. Frisch quotes Jackson’s ([1999]) text as his primary
source. Yet Jackson (in my edition) does not explicitly deduce (2) from an
independent principle of causality or give a precise formulation of such a
principle. What he does do, as Frisch notes, is to deduce the condition (2) from
standard electrodynamics for a special case (Section 7.10.B) without drawing
on causality conditions. He then observes (Section 7.10.C) that this outcome
is ‘in accord with our fundamental ideas of causality in physical phenomena’
and ﬁnally announces that (1) and (2) combined comprise ‘the most general
spatially local, linear, and causal relation...’
The development does not make clear how the step from the special to the
general case is taken. It might be, as Frisch suggests, that Jackson is calling
upon some more fundamental principle of causality that lies outside classical
electrodynamics. Or it might just be that Jackson is following a more benign
approach that needs no additional physical principles. That is, he is suggesting
that, in all of the more complicated cases, a more detailed and possibly very
difﬁcult analysis fully within electrodynamics would return the same result
(2). Since he is not giving the analysis but, nonetheless, is conﬁdent of its
outcome, he tries to make the result plausible by noting that it ﬁts with causal
expectations, although a precise causal principle is not actually formulated and
used to deduce the result.4
4 ThereisasimilarambiguityinanothersourceFrischcites.Toll’s([1956])principalgoalistoprove
the logical equivalence of dispersion relations in a fairly general context and ‘strict causality’.
The latter asserts that ‘no signal can travel faster than [c]’ and is also glossed by a condition that480 John D. Norton
4 Failure of the Principle of Causality Proposed
While I believe a principle of causality is not needed to complete dispersion
theory,wecanaskwhatareourprospectsofformulatinganon-trivialprinciple
that could serve this purpose. The question is worth exploring since Frisch at
least interprets the physics literature as asserting that the derivation of results
in dispersion theory are completed by invoking an independent principle of
causality.
Such attempts require a great deal more than a vague gesture at ‘our funda-
mental ideas of causality’. They require the presentation of a viable principle
of causality in a sufﬁciently precise form for its applicability and proper func-
tioning in this case to be apparent. My contention in this section is that neither
JacksonnorFrischformulatessuchaprinciple.Frisch’scandidatefortheappli-
cable principle is that (Frisch [2009a], Section 2): ‘an effect cannot temporally
precede its causes’.
I will seek to show the following. When we try to formulate a general state-
ment of the principle in terms sufﬁciently precise for physical theorizing, the
principle either fails or becomes too vague to use. If, however, we retract and
merelydeclaretheonecaseofdispersiontobeanimplementationofaprinciple
for which we offer no more general statement, then all we have achieved is a
relabeling of the facts of one case in suggestive but physically empty causal
language.
4.1 A sometimes principle
Frischdoesnotwanttocommittotheuniversalapplicabilityofthisprinciple.‘It
might in fact be true’, he allows, ‘...But I think we can allow for the possibility
that a certain causal condition is not true in general and nevertheless take it to
be physically well founded’. ([2009a], Section 3)
If Frisch is serious about this possibility, then his sometimes principle may
be no independent principle at all. It looks like a principle that holds, except
when it doesn’t. For, speaking ﬁguratively, how are we to know whether it
applies to some system? We must call upon the properties of that system and
afﬁrm that the principle holds for them. That is, the obtaining of the principle
of causality threatens merely to be a restating of the properties of the system
alreadyknown. Thedangeristhat theconformity of thesystemtotheprinciple
is not obviously equivalent to it, ‘no output can occur before the input’ (p. 1760). However, Toll
does not make clear whether strict causality is a universal principle to be required independently
of all physical theories or merely a result to be discovered and demonstrated within each physical
theory under consideration. Remarks in the concluding section suggest the latter. For Toll ﬁnds it
(p. 1770) ‘an open question whether or not strict causality is a valid physical hypothesis’ and then
considers merely as a possibility that ‘strict causality...prove[s] to be invalid or unenforceable in
future theories’.Is There an Independent Principle of Causality in Physics? 481
placesnoadditionalfactualconstraintuponit.Inthatsense,itwouldbemerely
honoriﬁc.
That threat is realizedif we retreat to the safety of merely considering disper-
sion processes in isolation. For then we can comfortably declare the incident
ﬁeld a ‘cause’, the scattered ﬁeld an ‘effect’, and the relation (2) of dispersion
theory as expressing the principle of causality in that it assures us that these
particular effects never precede their causes. If we just consider dispersion the-
ory in isolation, the exercise is purely one of labeling. Nothing is added by the
causal talk beyond restating the speciﬁc result already at hand in new causal
language.
That exercise in labeling is clearly not what Frisch intends. But if the exercise
is to be anything more, there must be some relation to systems and processes
outside dispersion theory. Of course there is such a connection in an informal
sense. The incident wave is analogous to my shout, as is the scattered wave
to the startled cats, ﬂeeing from the overturned cream jug. But that informal
connection merely makes the application of the causal language comfortable.
It does not locate dispersion processes within broader factual regularities; and
it does not supply a theoretical instrument of sufﬁcient precision to enable
completion of physical computations in dispersion theory. What we need is
some more general property of the system that would mark it antecedently
as causal. Then we would know antecedently that the restricted principle of
causality must apply to it and that it falls into a greater causal order in nature,
even if not a universal order.
In the following I will investigate what is needed to provide a more general
principle that is also precise enough for application in dispersion theory and
other physical theories.
4.2 The conditions of applicability are obscure
Let us presume that Frisch’s principle of causality is formulated precisely
enough for us to apply it in physical theories. If the principle is to serve as
indicated in scattering theory, it must be clear that the principle applies. To
see that its applicability is questionable, we need to recall that classical elec-
trodynamics is a time reversible theory. If the theory allows a process, then it
also allows its time reverse. The theory allows a dielectric to scatter an incident
wave. Therefore, it also allows a time reversed, scattered wave to collapse back
onto the dielectric and return the time reverse of the incident wave. Of course
this reverse process is highly unlikely in ordinary circumstances, just as it is
possible, but highly unlikely, for ripples in a pond to converge and eject a stone.
Now imagine a universe completely empty excepting two processes that we
will call ‘A’ and ‘B’. Process A has an incident wave, a dielectric, and a scattered
wave. Process B is the time reverse of A. The two processes are completely482 John D. Norton
isomorphic in all properties. Any property of one will have its isomorphic cor-
relate in the other. Any fact about one will have a correlate fact obtaining for
the other. One might be tempted to imagine that one of the two processes is
‘really’ the ordinary one, progressing normally in time; while the other is a the-
oretician’s fantasy, a possibility in principle, but in practice unrealizable. The
essentialpoint of the exampleisthat noproperty of the AandBsystemsdistin-
guish which is which. Every property of one has a perfect correlate in the other.
Let us assume that Frisch’s principle of causality applies to one of these
processes, the Aprocess, for example. That will beexpressedasa condition that
the present state of the process depends only on its past states. Exactly what
‘depends’ may amount to is to be decided by the principle. All that matters
for our purposes is that an exactly isomorphic condition of dependence will be
obtained in the B process, except that it will be time reversed. Indeed, using
t h et i m eo r d e rn a t u r a lt op r o c e s sA ,w ew o u l dh a v et os a yt h a tt h ep r i n c i p l eo f
causalityrequiresthepresentstatesofprocessBtodependuponitsfuturestates.
In short, if the principle applies to process A, it fails for process B; and con-
v e r s e l y .T h i si sareductio ad absurdum of the applicability of Frisch’s principle
of causality to scattering in classical electrodynamics. Or, to put the outcome
another way, if the principle holds for one process but not the other, then the
decision as to which process is properly causal cannot be based on any physical
difference between the two processes. For every physical property of one pro-
cess has an exact correlate in the other. The declaration that the principle holds
for one process but not the other has become an arbitrary stipulation without
a physical basis.
It seems to me that there is only one escape. It is to propose that there is,
as a factual matter outside electrodynamics, a natural time direction. When
we require that electrodynamics must respect that direction, we are able to
preclude one of the two processes. Possibilities of this sort have been repeatedly
offered, weighed, and found wanting. Nearly a century ago, for example, Ritz
(in Einstein and Ritz [1909]) urged that electrodynamics should be formulated
in terms of retarded potentials only, thereby denying the time reversibility of
the theory. The mainstream agreed with Einstein’s response. He insisted that
the time-reversed processes were possible, just statistically very unlikely.5
To get a sense of why the mainstream has ﬂowed in this direction, recall that
thetime-reversedprocesscanbebrokenupintomanysmallparts.Locally,each
small section of the collapsing incident wave is merely a wavefront propagating
in quite ordinary ways; momentarily, the force exerted by the incident wave
on the unscattering charges just follows the Lorentz force law; and so on
5 Ritz’s proposal is ofno help to Frisch’sprincipleof causality. For with it, no principle ofcausality
isneededtocompletethescatteringcomputation.Therestrictiontoretardedpotentialsisaprecise
electrodynamic expression of the restriction that the present electrodynamic state depends only
on its past state.Is There an Independent Principle of Causality in Physics? 483
throughout. It is only when the many small pieces are assembled that we ﬁnd
an unfamiliar process. It seems mistaken to invoke additional laws to prohibit
a total system, perfectly admissible in all its parts. Indeed, we have little doubt
that were we somehow to contrive a perfect time reversal of a scattered wave,
its future course would be the time reverse of ordinary scattering.
Of course, Frisch is well aware of the problems of combining a time-
asymmetric principle of causality with a time-symmetric physical theory and
discussesthematsomelengthinhis([2009a], Section3).Noneofthearguments
given there escapes the difﬁculty just described for his principle of causality.
His most interesting proposal is that we might recover the time asymmetry of
causation empirically. We intervene in a process and discover as a matter of
experimental fact that our intervention perturbs the future and not the past.
It is precisely to avoid such considerations that my example of the A and B
processes assumes an otherwise empty universe in which there are no agents to
intervene. In any case, it is unclear what the intervention experiments reveal.
The system at issue is now exceedingly complicated and poorly understood:
it is the scattering system plus human beings who poke their ﬁngers into the
beams and have sensors—eyes—presumed not to emit radiation but only to
absorb it. How are we to know whether asymmetries arising in a system that
complicated are due to an intrinsically asymmetric causal relation? Or are they
due to some asymmetry introduced into an otherwise fully time symmetric
theory through the conditions that describe the vastly complicated system of
humans with intervening ﬁngers and watching eyes? And do we doubt that,
if those ﬁngers could bring about the time reversal of a scattered wave as an
initial condition, then the time reverse of scattering would ensue?
4.3 Effects can come before their causes
What of the principal content of the principle, that effects cannot precede
causes? Frisch ([2009a], Section 3) supports his principle of causality with
the remark that neither of my earlier writings (Norton [2003], [2007]) includes
counterexamples to it. That lacuna is easily remedied here, for there are many
cases in which the effect preceding the cause is accepted as a possibility.
There is a ﬂourishing literature on the physical possibility of time travel
(Arntzenius and Maudlin [2005]). It is no longer believed that problems of
causality—the ‘grandfather paradox’—preclude its physical possibility. Every
instance of time travel involves effects preceding their causes.
Another example arises in the case of tachyons in special relativity. If one
observer judges a tachyon to be propagating forward in time, then we can
always ﬁnd a second observer who is moving inertially with respect to the ﬁrst
and who judges the time order of the states to be reversed. If the ﬁrst observer
judges that the direction of propagation coincides with the direction of causal484 John D. Norton
action, then the second observer would describe that judgment as afﬁrming
that the later states causally affect the earlier states.6
Finally, there is a third example in the A and B processes above. Let us say
that there is some sense in which the incident wave of A is the cause of the
scattered wave of A, the effect. Then, under the isomorphism indicated above,
we will conclude that the later state of the time-reversed incident wave of B is
the cause of the earlier time-reversed scattered wave of B.
The idea that effects might precede their causes has sufﬁcient currency that
it has become the subject of an article, “Backwards Causation” in the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Faye [2005]).
4.4 Vagueness of the relata and of the notion of causal process
If Frisch’s principle of causality is to be applicable to physical systems, we
must know precisely w h a ti sac a u s e ,w h a ti sa ne f f e c t ,a n dw h i c hp r o c e s s e sa r e
causal.Otherwisewewillnot know howtoapplytheprincipleinconcretecases
of physical theorizing.
Consider the ﬁrst two questions. What precisely is a cause? What precisely
is an effect? Can anything be a cause and an effect? Surely there must be some
restrictions and they need to be made explicit. Presumably, for example, causes
and effects must be the states of physical systems restricted in time, for the
principle makes assertions on their time order. Are they any state extended
over some short time interval? Or are they any state at an instant? If we are
in special relativity, which instant do we choose? The relativity of simultaneity
allows many competing instants, according to the inertial frame of reference
chosen. If we seek to avoid the problem by requiring the states to be localized
at a point in space, are we thereby precluding by ﬁat that non-local quantum
states can enter into causal relations?
Now the third question: What sorts of processes are properly labeled as
causal? In the case of scattering, causal dependence was translated into the
mathematical dependence of a ﬁeld at one time on another ﬁeld at other times.
Are all such dependencies causal processes? If so, what are we to make of
Lagrange principles? A particle’s trajectory is picked out as the one that ex-
tremizes the integrated action for its entire history between a start and an end
point. As a result, the computation of the acceleration of the particle now in-
volves its motion at earlier and later times. Is this dependence causal? If so, we
have a violation of Frisch’s principle of causality, for a future state is affecting
the present state. If it is not causal, how are we to pick out the computations
that correspond to real causal processes?
6 Shouldwejudgetachyonstobephysicallyimpossiblesincethissortofbackwardcausationmight
lead to paradoxes? While that concern has been debated at some length in the literature, I agree
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Finally, when we have a causal process, how do we decide which of the relata
is the cause and which is the effect? We cannot merely use their time order to
decide; that is, we cannot just pick out the cause as the earlier relatum and
the effect as the later. That reduces the principle that causes cannot precede
their effects to a deﬁnition. If the principle is to have physical content, it must
provide an independent characterization of what intrinsically distinguishes a
cause from an effect. What is that characterization?7
5 Conclusion
In sum, it is not so hard to ﬁnd vague and sometimes grand-sounding causal
talk in the physics literature. It is easy to yield to the temptation of saying that
this shows that there really is an independent principle of causality at work in
physics. There is, however, a chasm between vague and grand causal talk and
a precise principle of causality that can and should be used to augment the
physical content of existing physical theories. Frisch’s proposal has not closed
thatgapand,onthebasisofthemanyobstaclesjustpresented,itseemsunlikely
that this gap can be closed.
In (Norton [2003]), I suggested that causal fundamentalism and its asso-
ciated principle of causality succumbed to a dilemma: either the view places
factual constraints on the world (in which case they proved false); or they did
not (in which case the causal labels were honoriﬁcs). Frisch’s attempt to locate
physical content in the idea that dispersion is causal meets an analogous fate.
Insofar as it is precisely stated, his causality condition is not derived from a
broaderregularity;itmerelyattachestheadjective‘causal’toaparticularresult
in scattering theory. The result is factual; but it is already so and not made any
more or less factual by the adding of the adjective ‘causal’. When we seek the
broader regularity, we ﬁnd that it most likely cannot be stated precisely enough
forapplicationinphysicaltheorizing,evenallowingthatthisbroaderregularity
need not hold universally.
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